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Abstract
We describe how the compliance requirements for data retention
from recent laws such as the US Sarbanes Oxley Act may be sup-
ported by a tamper-evident secure storage system based on probe
storage with a patterned magnetic medium. This medium supports
normal read/write operations by out-of-plane magnetisation of in-
dividual dots. We report on an experiment to show that in principle
the medium also supports a separate class of write-once operation
that destroys the out-of-plane magnetisation property of the dots
irreversibly by precise local heating. The write-once operation
can be used to support flexible data retention by tamper-evident
writing and physical data deletion.
1 Introduction
Laws such as the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) [15], or
the EU data retention directive [21] stipulate that business critical
information must be retained for a precise amount of time, after
which it must be destroyed. The act of destroying the information
must be recorded, and all cached copies, backups and any derived
information that could be used to reconstruct the business critical
information, must be destroyed as well. Information that was de-
stroyed too early ultimately lead to the collapse of Enron and its
accountant Arthur Anderson. Information that is destroyed too late
is a minefield of liability [7]. In a 2005 study [3], 216 respondents
from large and small companies (65% from the US, and 35% from
the rest of the world) stated that SOX and data retention are the
two major issues their organisations are struggling with.
Not only do modern organisations have to deal with compli-
ance, their workforce is also increasingly mobile. Consider the
following scenario of a loyal employee who processes and stores
customer data that is subject to compliance regulations on her lap-
top. She takes her laptop with her when she visits customers. The
main threat is someone tampering with the information on her lap-
top. The risk of tampering is particularly acute when she is out
of the office because it is difficult always to keep an eye on your
belongings in airports, hotels, at customer sites etc.
Assume that to mitigate the risk, the organisation has set the
following inefficient (but effective) data retention policy: (1) a full
backup of all business critical information must be made before
leaving the office, (2) a secure hash of the information must be
carried as a separate item (for instance printed on a piece of pa-
per). Each time the employee suspects foul play (to be confirmed
by checking whether the hash of the information still matches the
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hash on the piece of paper), she restores the laptop to the state it
was in when she left the office, and (3) the information and the
backups are deleted when the retention period expires.
Problem The data retention policy sketched above is inefficient
for at least three reasons. Firstly, making and restoring full back-
ups can take a long time. Secondly, a backup represents yet an-
other copy of the information that is subject to compliance regula-
tions. Thirdly, the employee risks loosing all the changes that she
made to the information after leaving the office.
We propose a partial solution to these problems by combining
an idea of Molnar et al. [12] for tamper-evident storage with our
own work on probe storage on patterned media. We introduce
each of these three elements below.
Molnar et al. [12] describe how standard Programmable Read-
Only Memory (PROM) can be used to build tamper-evident stor-
age. The basic idea is to store each bit of information in a cell
occupying two bits using Manchester encoding: the bit 1 is en-
coded as the cell 10 and 0 is encoded as 01. The value 11 indicates
a cell that has not yet been used (all bits in a PROM are initial-
ized to 1). The value 00 indicates a cell that has been tampered
with for the following reason. The physical properties of a PROM
make it impossible to change a 0 back into a 1 (except by expos-
ing the entire memory module to ultra violet light, which would
reset the entire module). Therefore, the only way to tamper with
information (which is encoded as 01 or 10) is to clear a bit. This
immediately results in an invalid code 00, which provides the evi-
dence of tampering.
A Probe storage device with a patterned medium does not ex-
ist at present, although an advanced prototype of the Millipede,
a probe storage device with uniform media capable of storing
over 641 Gbit per square inch has been demonstrated by IBM
research [17]. The Millipede basically consists of a voice-coil
based actuator, a polymer medium and an MEMS array of 64×64
read/write probes with tips as sharp as 10 nm.
A patterned medium [23] consists of a regular arrangement of
magnetic dots separated by sub-micron distances that can be mag-
netised in two out-of-plane directions. The magnetic dots can be
read and written any number of times. However, the out-of-plane
magnetisation property of a dot can also be irreversibly destroyed
by precise local heating. The idea is to use this feature to create
a storage device that operates as a RAM, until part of the space
is frozen. From then on the frozen part of the device operates
as a tamper-evident store, while the rest continues to operate as a
RAM. The ability to freeze parts of the store incrementally pro-
vides flexibility that cannot be matched by CD, DVD, (EE)PROM
or any other current technology.
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Figure 1: µSPAM approach to Probe storage on patterned media.
Contribution The contributions of the paper are (1) to study the
feasibility of the freeze operation itself and then (2) to show how
probe storage on patterned medium with a freeze operation might
be used to support flexible data retention policies.
The paper is organised as follows. Related work is discussed in
the next section. A brief introduction into our approach towards
realising probe storage on patterned media is given in Section 3.
Section 4 describes an experiment to measure the temperature that
must be achieved to destroy the out-of-plane magnetic property
of a dot. A proposal for a tamper-evident storage and deletion is
presented in Section 5. The last section concludes.
2 Related work
During the last ten years, several recording systems based on probe
microscopy technology have been proposed. The IBM lead al-
ready presented above is followed by other companies such as
HP [13], Samsung [10], Seagate [6], LG [5] and a number of uni-
versities such as Exeter, Carnegie Mellon, DSI Singapore, Tohoku,
Yonsei, and Twente. Probe storage is also being combined with
disk storage; Hong et al. [2] propose a hybrid disk / probe stor-
age architecture where probe storage bricks are used to extend the
MTBF of the system, estimated 23 years.
Our proposal supports data integrity but not confidentiality and
authenticity, for which cryptographic tools would be needed. Not
using cryptography in our proposal avoids all troubling issues of
key management. Kher and Kim [4] provide a good survey of
crypto based distributed secure storage.
3 Probe storage on patterned media
The design for the Twente Micro Scanning Probe Array Memory
(µSPAM) (Figure 1) is made out of two or more silicon wafers
bonded to each other. One half contains the (magnetic) medium.
An electrostatic stepper actuator, such as the µWalker [20] or Har-
monica drive [19] is used to move the medium. The other half
consists of one large array of probes.
The patterned medium The medium for the µSPAM is a regu-
lar matrix of magnetic single domain dots. Such a discrete medium
is expected to be able to support higher bit densities compared
to the continuous polycrystalline media used in the hard disk to-
day [22].
We have already shown that a matrix with a period of 200 nm
can be achieved [24]. An scanning electron microscope and mag-
netic image is shown in Figure 2. An improved setup with peri-
odicities down to 150 nm has recently been realised [8]. We are
currently aiming at a period of 100 nm, being 50 nm dot size and
50 nm spacing. This will give a capacity of 10 Gbit/cm2 (=65
Gbit/inch2).
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external field
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Figure 3: The principle of an MFM-measurement
The probes For reading, the MFM (Magnetic Force
Microscopy)-principle has been chosen [16]. An MFM-probe is
made by placing a small magnetic element, the tip, on a cantilever
spring. Typical dimensions are a cantilever length of 200 µm,
element length of 4 µm and diameter of 50 nm and a distance
from the surface of 30 nm.
Figure 3 shows the principle of an MFM-measurement. The
magnetic tip is attracted or repelled, depending on the stray field
of the medium. The tip is affected by the magnetic orientation
of a dot. The displacement of the cantilever might be measured
by means of the change in capacity between the cantilever and the
medium. Bits can be written by the combined field of the magnetic
tip and an externally applied field generated by a coil placed on the
backside of the medium [24].
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Figure 2: Scanning Electron Micrscope (left, 500 nm pitch) and Magnetic Force Microscopy image (right, 200 nm pitch) of patterned
media.
Figure 4: Anisotropy as a function of the annealing temperature
4 Change in anisotropy by annealing
To support the freeze operation, it should be possible to destroy the
out-of-plane magnetic property of the dots. The magnetic material
used in the dots consists of a stack of extremely thin Co and Pt
layers, each no more than 1 nm thick [24]. The interfaces between
the Co and Pt film cause an easy axis of magnetisation perpendic-
ular to the interfaces. Due to the delicate structure of these films,
they do not support high temperatures over long periods of time.
Above a certain temperature, the interface between the Co and Pt
mixes, and the perpendicular anisotropy of the film is destroyed.
As a result the easy axis of magnetisation turns in the film plane.
This is an irreversible process. After heat treatment, the interfaces
cannot be restored.
To determine at which temperature interface mixing occurs, we
have measured the anisotropy constant K of samples subjected to
six different temperatures. The anisotropy constants were calcu-
lated by a Fourier transformation of the torque curve obtained with
an applied field of 1350 kA/m. Figure 4 shows the dependence of
the anisotropy value as a function of the annealing temperature.
The anisotropy of the unannealed film is 80 kJ/m3. This value is
maintained up to an annealing temperature of 500 ◦C. Above 600
◦C the value of K drops dramatically.
The unannealed sample (a) and (b) a sample annealed at 700 ◦C
were investigated by low angle X-ray diffraction (XRD) to inves-
tigate the interfaces (Figure 5). A peak around 8 degrees on the
2 θ axis is visible on the sample without annealing. This peak is
due to the periodicity of the Co-Ni and Pt multilayers. From the
XRD measurement we can determine that each layer has a thick-
ness of 0.6 nm. In the annealed sample, this peak has disappeared.
From these measurements we can conclude that after an annealing
treatment at a temperature higher than 600 ◦C, the interfaces have
mixed, the perpendicular anisotropy is lost and the out-of-plane
magnetic properties of the film are destroyed.
By measuring high-angle-XRD, the crystal structure of the films
can be investigated (Figure 6). In the annealed sample, we can find
a strong reflection peak around 41.7 degrees in 2 θ axis. This peak
can be characterized to a fct Co-Pt (111) plane [25]. It suggests
that a new crystalline structure of fct Co-Pt was formed in the film.
This crystal exhibits magnetic anisotropy in the [001] direction,
i.e. there are tilted magnetic easy axes in the film (not perpendic-
ular, not in plane). So there is no risk that after excessive heating
the perpendicular anisotropy can be restored by crystallisation.
Further research is needed to determine the time required, the
amount of energy dissipated, the wear on the tip, and the effect
of heating one dot on the neighbouring dots. The energy must be
conducted off the medium for it not to bend or warp, and to avoid
increasing the error rate of the perpendicular read processes due to
thermal noise. It is not unlikely that by tailoring the materials and
layer structures, the interface mixing temperature can be reduced.
In any case it will be necessary to use the write-once operation
sparingly.
5 Tamper-evident writing and deletion
Having described the most important aspects of the physical reali-
sation of probe storage on patterned media, we turn our attention to
the system aspects. We argue that the compliance inspired data re-
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Figure 5: X-ray diffraction under a low angle of two samples, one
with and one without annealing.
Figure 6: X-ray diffraction under a high angle of the same two
samples as for low angle XRD.
Figure 7: Above: dots are magnetised upwards or downwards;
Below: dots have a perpendicular or in-plane easy axis.
tention requirements can be served flexibly by a small set of oper-
ations. The first operation writes the information to the medium in
such a way that physical and logical tampering can be detected by
a second verify operation. The third operation physically deletes
information. We describe a set of low level bit operations first,
followed by the description of the high level sector operations to
freeze, verify, and delete.
Magnetic read and write a bit We require two read and two
write operations of bits. In the normal mode of operation we have a
medium with a regular matrix of magnetic single domain dots with
a preferred axis of magnetisation perpendicular to the medium.
This is illustrated in the top half of Figure 7, which shows the sub-
strate and three layered dots. The first and last are magnetised in
the upwards direction, the middle in the downwards direction. The
magnetic write bit operation mwb sets the direction of the magneti-
sation (up is 1, down is 0) and the corresponding read mrb senses
the direction of the magnetisation.
Electrical read and write of a bit By heating an individual dot
by means of an electric current flowing from the probe tip via
the dot to the medium, the multilayer structure of a dot is de-
stroyed and as a result the easy axis of magnetisation rotates into
the medium. The data stored by mwb is lost and there is no corre-
lation between the original out-of-plane direction of the magneti-
sation and the in-plane direction. However, we have a new way of
representing data: the initial state of a dot with out-of-plane mag-
netisation is 1, ewb writes 0 to a dot by setting the magnetisation
in-plane. The bottom half of Figure 7 shows that the layered struc-
ture of the last dot is permanently destroyed. The electrical write
bit ewb is thus an irreversible process, which can only change a
1 into a 0. We are confident that even a skilled focused ion beam
(FIB) operator would find it difficult to reconstruct a perfect out-
of-plane dot because she would have to remove the debris of an
in-plane dot first, and then deposit several thin Co and Pt layers
in a sub-micron area just to reconstruct one dot. Using magnetic
imaging techniques [9], a forensics team would probably not have
any difficulty identifying a reconstructed out-of-plane dot from an
original out-of-plane dot.
The read operation erb detects the presence or absence of an
out-of-plane dot by performing an atomic sequence of mrb and
mwb operations as follows: (1) mrb original, (2) mwb inverse of
the original, (3) mrb and check that the inverse has indeed been
read back, (4) mwb original, (5) mrb and check that the original
has indeed been read back. If any of the two checks fail we assume
that the dot has lost its out-of-plane property and return 0, else erb
returns 1.
Since the medium and the head are stationary, erb is at least 5
times slower than mrb but there are no positioning delays incurred
as would be the case with a spinning disk. ewb is also slower
than mwb because of the local heating process. However, as stated
before, the idea is to use the erb and ewb operations sparingly.
Magnetic read and write a sector Following Pozidis et al. [17]
we assume a standard sector size of 512 bytes and about 15% sec-
tor overhead for the sector header, ECC, and CRC. All data can be
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read and written using the efficient magnetic sector write mws and
read mrs, subject to error correction appropriate to the medium,
the tips etc.
Freeze a sequence of sectors Our approach is inspired by the
Venti archival system [18] where the integrity of a sequence of
blocks is protected by protecting the integrity of the hash. While
Venti stores the hash separately from the block, we are able to bind
the hash physically to the blocks. The operation freeze, which,
when given a suitable n and a sequence of 2n sectors aligned on
a 2n boundary, performs the following atomic sequence of steps:
(1) read 2n−1 sectors representing the information to be protected
using 2n − 1 calls to mrs, (2) calculate a secure hash (e.g. SHA-
256) of the sectors just read, (3) write the 512 byte Manchester
encoding of the 256 byte hash in the last (2n-th) sector using the
tamper-evident write operation ewb, (4) check that the hash can
be read back using erb, or else fail.
All properly aligned sequences of 2n sectors can be frozen in-
dividually, thus providing significant flexibility. Frozen data can
still be read efficiently, and as often as needed.
The freeze operation, when applied to a sequence of 2n sec-
tors that has already been frozen will fail unless the Manchester
encoding of the new and the old hash are exactly the same. This
would require the hash of the old and the new information to be
the same, which we assume to be unlikely due to the collision re-
sistance of secure hash functions such as SHA-256.
Verify a frozen sequence Firstly, we analyse how the verify
operation detects all possible attempts to tamper with the frozen
information. An attack perpetrated using one or more mwb, ewb,
or mws operations on the information is either harmless or it is
detected. There are three cases to consider. Depending on the
ECC, (a) one class of tampering will be corrected by the ECC thus
not interfering with the integrity of the information; (b) a second
class of tampering will cause the ECC to fail, signalling the user
that her data is corrupted, and (c) the third and final class of tam-
pering yields a valid code word that is different from the original
information. This third case is not detected by the ECC but it is
detected when the verify operation checks whether the hash of
the information corresponds to the hash written in the last sector.
Secondly, the only type of attack possible on the hash is to
”burn” another dot using the ewb operation. This would have the
effect of either changing a Manchester encoding 01 into 00 or an
encoding 10 into 00, both of which are detected as an invalid code.
Finally, since the hash immediately follows the data (i.e. there
are no pointers linking the data to be protected to the hash that
can be tampered with as in Venti [18]), there is no way of separat-
ing the data from the hash, so that the integrity of the hash truly
protects the integrity of the data.
Delete a frozen sequence Our proposal for secure deletion is
to physically change the medium where the data was stored, but
more subtly than just by shredding the entire device [14]. The
mwb operation might suffer from memory remanence problems.
Therefore, the ewb operation must be used to burn each and every
bit of the data, leaving the hash intact to witness the fact that the
data was once written with the integrity check in place and that it
has now been destroyed. Without hardware support, secure dele-
tion is a difficult problem for at least two reasons. Firstly, Bauer
and Priyantha argue that due to memory remanence properties of
the media, recovering data deleted normally from a disk drive is
remarkably easy [1]. Secondly, Mitra and Winslett add that even
when the data is deleted, correlation of derived data sets may make
it possible to recover the original, deleted data [11].
Our approach is to avoid making copies of the data. Probe stor-
age on patterned media makes it possible to store a working copy
of the data, until the data is finalised, at which point it should be
kept for as long as the data retention policy prescribes. There is
no need to copy the data from a disk to another system such as an
optical write once medium which has the correct archival proper-
ties; our system provides working storage and archival storage all
on one medium.
6 Conclusions
Probe storage on patterned media is a promising technology for
developing secure storage. The capacity of such devices will be
huge, and the tamper resistance can be excellent. The experiment
reported in this paper demonstrates that in principle it is possible
to use a patterned magnetic medium in two essentially different
ways: for normal read-write purposes and for write-once/read pur-
poses. It is physically impossible to alter the data after the write
once operation has been used. Having described an approach to
storing data such that (1) any logical or physical tampering can be
detected, and (2) the data can be deleted such that even a skilled
forensics lab will be unable to recover the data, we believe that
we have provided at least a partial answer to the data retention re-
quirements induced by modern compliance legislation. The main
advantage of the approach is its combination of integrity and flex-
ibility: normal data processing can be interleaved with tamper-
evident freeze, verify and delete operations. Much work remains
to be done, including finding an effective way of making backups.
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